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It is a privilege to be invited to deliver this lecture in honor of
Jonathan Charney.
Professor Charney was, of course, one of this country's most
respected public international lawyers, both at home and abroad.
Described as "one of the leading international legal scholars of his

* Member of the UN International Law Commission. I wish to express my gratitude
to Omri Sender for his assistance. The present text is a slightly modified and updated
version of the lecture as delivered.
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generation,"' he was also an inspiring teacher. 2 Particularly
relevant to my subject today, Charney had a special interest in the
sources of international law, including customary international law
and the role of international organizations. He was famously a
persistent objector to the "persistent objector rule." He devised and
coedited the invaluable InternationalMaritimeBoundariesseries. This
publication, now in its seventh volume and stretching over some 5,000
pages, is an essential resource for anyone dealing with maritime
delimitation. He has written on Kosovo and on Antarctica. These are
all matters that I have followed closely myself, and so I have a
particular interest in his work.
My subject today is "International Organizations and Customary
International Law"-that is, the role of international organizations in
relation to the formation and determination of rules of customary
international law.
Charney devoted a good part of his well-known article on
"Universal International Law" to what he termed "contemporary
international law-making." By that, he meant chiefly law-making
within "international forums"-that is, within organs of international
organizations and at international conferences.
He starts the
discussion from the somewhat heretical position that
[w]hile customary law is still created in the traditional way, that process
has increasingly given way in recent years to a more structured method,
especially in the case of important normative developments.
Rather than state practice and opinio juris, multilateral forums
often play a central role in the creation and shaping of contemporary
3
international law.

Charney's conclusions, however, are perhaps not as radical as his
premise. He acknowledged that "[s]ome may question the authority to
legislate universally, even in the face of some dissent, because it
appears to be inconsistent with the sovereignty and autonomy of
states. Such apprehension is not unreasonable. The international legal
system, however, will invoke this authority sparingly." 4
It cannot be said that Charney's proposal for a dramatic change in
the (secondary) rules of recognition has been widely accepted by states.
It would indeed shift the process through which customary
international law is formed from state practice to some kind of
legislation by various unspecified fora, and who is to say that it would

1.
W. Michael Reisman, In Memoriam, Jonathan L Charney: An Appreciation,
36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 23, 23 (2003).
2.
See generally James R. McHenry, III, Tribute, Professor JonathanI Charney:
Commitment Underpinned by Conviction, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 11 (2003)
(describing personal and shared experiences, and anecdotes from students of Professor
Charney).
3.
Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529,
543 (1995).
4.
Id. at 551.
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be "invoked sparingly." Nevertheless, like all of Charney's writings,
this article offers much food for thought. He was ahead of his time. As
we shall see, the multilateral activities he discussed could actually
generate state practice and evidence opinio juris, the two elements
widely accepted as the building blocks of customary international law,
and, in that way, indeed play a significant role in creating (and
expressing) rules of such law.
I shall first say a word about the background to the subject and
why it is important (Part I). Then I shall look at what states do within
the context of international organizations (Part II), and finally, before
concluding, I shall consider whether international organizations as
such may contribute to the formation and determination of customary
international law and to what extent they are bound by it (Part III).

I. INTRODUCTION

As you know, public international lawyers devote an inordinate
amount of time and effort to trying to explain the sources of the law
that they claim to teach or practice. That is not the case in other fields
of law, where the sources are more or less clear and not seriously
questioned. It is widely accepted as a starting point-at least by
practitioners-that the sources of public international law are those
listed in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ). Of these, the two principal sources are treaties and customary
international law.
It has sometimes been suggested that the importance of
customary international law is now greatly reduced as so much is
regulated by treaty. Of course, treaties, where they apply, do tend to
overshadow customary law. But even in a field like the law of the sea,
where we have the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS)-hundreds of pages long, the so-called "constitution for
the oceans," with (as of now) 167 states parties-customary
international law still applies in relations among nonparties (such as
the United States) and between nonparties and parties. In its two most
recent law of the sea cases, decided in 2012 and 2014, the International
Court of Justice applied customary international law, since in each
case one side (Colombia and Peru, respectively) was not a party to the
Law of the Sea Convention. In a field like international human rights
law, while there are a large number of detailed treaties, many of the
most difficult issues that arise in practice, especially before the courts
of states that are not party to many of the treaties, concern the
existence and scope of customary international law. The same is true
of the law of armed conflict, particularly noninternational armed
conflict, but also for those states, like the United States, that are not
parties to the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions.
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Rules of customary international law may also fill gaps in treaties
and assist in their interpretation. For example, the customary
international law on the use of force (the jus ad bellum) helps to inform
the UN Charter. A court may, moreover, seek to apply customary
international law where treaty law cannot be applied because of limits
on its jurisdiction or applicable law. Finally, customary international
law is "the principal construction material for general international
law" (in the sense of its capability to generally bind all states), 5
underlying the international legal structure as a whole.
The international law relating to treaties-how they become
binding, how they terminate, how they are to be interpreted, etc.-is
well-trodden ground. The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties largely covers the field. By contrast, customary international
law is often seen as shrouded in mystery and paradox, the subject of
endless theorizing among academics. A couple of days ago I attended a
conference at Duke University (with Professor Wuerth 6), entitled
"Custom in Crisis." I am not at all convinced that there is a crisis. As I
recently wrote, together with a colleague,
[W]hile the theory of customary international law may well be "one of the
big mysteries of international legal scholarship," the reality of practice
remains relatively straightforward . . . . The theoretical torment which
accompanies such law in the books rarely impedes it in action, where a
settled methodology for ascertaining the existence of a rule of customary
7
international law is clearly evident.

This settled methodology is often referred to as the "two-element
approach." Article 38 of the ICJ Statute refers to "international custom,
as evidence of a generalpracticeaccepted as law": so, what is needed to
ascertain a rule of customary international law is, first, a general
practice (often referred to as a "state practice") and, second, evidence
of the acceptance of that practice as law (often referred to by the Latin
term "opiniojuris").
The International Law Commission of the United Nations
(Commission) has recently begun working on a topic now entitled
"Identification of Customary International Law." In deciding to take
up this topic, the Commission was well aware of the difficulties in
attempting to "codify the relatively flexible process by which rules of
customary international law are formed". 8 But it was also aware of the

5.
V.I. KUZNETSOV & B.R. TUZMUKHAMEDOV, INTERNATIONAL LAw - A RUSSIAN
INTRODUCTION 77 (W.E. Butler ed., 2009).
6.
Professor of Law, Director of International Legal Studies, Vanderbilt
University Law School.
7.
Omri Sender & Michael Wood, The Emergence of Customary International
Law: Between Theory and Practice, in HANDBOOK ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW MAKING (C. Brolmann & Y. Radi eds.) (forthcoming).
8.
Report of the Study Group on the Future Work of the InternationalLaw
Commission, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION AND THE FUTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 42 (M. R. Anderson et al. eds., 1998).
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need for some reasonably authoritative guidance on how to identify
rules of customary international law in concrete cases, especially at a
time when "questions of customary international law increasingly fall
to be dealt with by those who may not be international law specialists,
such as those working in the domestic courts of many countries, those
in government ministries other than Ministries for Foreign Affairs,
and those working for non-governmental organizations." Of course, in
this country you have a useful piece of guidance for the judiciary and
others in the relevant section of the Third Restatement of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States; other states and actors, for the
most part, do not. A further reason for the Commission to take up the
topic was to seek to add to the legitimacy of this important source of
international law, which has often been challenged due to its inherent
flexibility, not least in academic circles. In doing so, the Commission
seeks to dispel some of the mysteries and paradoxes associated with
customary international law and increase its predictability.
The Commission took up the topic in 2012 and, as usual,
appointed a Special Rapporteur. I have so far produced two reports, in
2013 and 2014.10 In the second report, I proposed 11 draft conclusions.
These, in turn, were referred to the Commission's Drafting Committee
in 2014, which provisionally adopted eight conclusions."
One of the central conclusions adopted in 2014 sets out the basic
two-element approach. It reads:
To determine the existence of a rule of customary international law and
its content, it is necessary to ascertain whether there is a general practice
that is accepted as law (opiniojuris).

The two-element approach is often referred to in terms of state practice
plus the acceptance by states of the practice as law. What role, then, do
international organizations play in this process?
I shall first make three basic points about international
organizations (by which I mean intergovernmental organizations, not
nongovernmental organizations). First, international organizations,
while subjects of international law, are not states. They are established
by states, but, like companies, they have separate (international) legal

9.
Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 63d Sess., Apr. 2-June 3, July 12-Aug. 12,
2011, Annex A, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/66/10; GAOR, 66th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2011)
[hereinafter ILC Report 2011].
10.
All Commission documents referred to in this lecture are available on the
Commission's website: INT'L LAw COMM'N, http://www.un.org/aw/ilc/ (last visited Feb.
19, 2015) [http://perma.cclH6VL-FLLV] (archived Feb. 8, 2015).
11.
For lack of time, the Drafting Committee did not deal in 2014 with the draft
conclusions on "acceptance as law." See Identification of Customary International Law,
Statement of the Chairman of the Drafting Committee (Aug. 7, 2014) [hereinafter
Drafting
Committee
Chairman
Statement],
http://1egal.un.org/ilc/sessions/66/
DCChairmanStatement(IdentificationofCustom).pdf
[http://perma.cc/MH6X-J3BF]
(archived Feb. 8, 2015) (suggesting that these draft conclusions concerning "acceptance
as law" will be addressed during the Commission's next session).
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personalities. Second, their nature is very different from that of
states. Unlike states, they have limited powers and functions, set out
expressly or by necessary implication in the treaty by which they are
established (the constituent instrument). Third, they are all quite
different from each other. They range from a universal organization
with broad political purposes like the United Nations; to a regional
organization like the Organization of American States; to a
supranational organization like the European Union, which in many
respects acts like a state; to specialized and technical institutions like
the World Bank, the World Health Organization, and the International
Telecommunication Union. So it is not easy to generalize about the role
of international organizations. No two are alike. And as the
International Court of Justice has said, "The subjects of law in any
legal system are not necessary identical in their nature or in the extent
of their rights .... ."12

Much has been written about "law-making" through international
organizations. Jonathan Charney's article on Universal International
Law drew attention to the very great practical importance of
international organizations in today's world. Through international
organizations, states interact intensively and adopt positions, often
jointly, on a continuing and collective basis that would have been
unimaginable in the not too distant past. This inevitably has an
important impact on the development of customary international
law.1 3
What I want to do is to explain the role of international
organizations in the customary law process in terms of the accepted
two-element methodology for the determination of rules of customary
international law.
It is important at this stage to distinguish between two quite
separate matters. First, in assessing whether there is a general
practice, one has to take into account the acts (including verbal acts) of
states in connection with the activities of international organizations
and whether there is opinio juris of states that may be deduced from
such acts. That is relatively uncontroversial and of much practical
importance in today's world. But, second, there is the possible
contribution that the practice and opinio juris of international
organizations themselves, as subjects of international law, may make
to the rules of customary international law. For the time being at least,
that is more controversial.
This important distinction, between acts of member states and
acts of the organization, needs constantly to be kept in mind. But the

Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,
12.
Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 178 (Apr. 11).
13.
See G. CAHIN, LA COUTUME INTERNATIONALE ET LES ORGANISATIONS
INTERNATIONALES: L'INCIDENCE DE LA DIMENSION INSTITUTIONELLE SUR LE PROCESSUS

COUTUMIER (2001).

2015]

2014JONATHANJ. CHARNEY DISTINGUISHED LECTURE

615

distinction may not always be easy to maintain in practice. When the
UN Security Council adopts a resolution with implications for
customary international law, it is an act of the Security Council as an
organ (and hence of the United Nations). But the fifteen members of
the Council, by their votes and statements, may also have acted on
their own views of customary international law. So the same procedure
may involve both the practice of states and the practice of an
international organization. An example from the Security Council
concerns the question whether the right of self-defense is available in
response to attacks by non-state actors, such as transnational terrorist
groups. In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11
September 2001, the Security Council adopted resolutions 1368 (2001)
and 1373 (2001) reaffirming "the inherent right of individual and
collective self-defence as recognized by the Charter of the United
Nations." Those resolutions have been cited as evidence that the right
of self-defense applies in relation to an attack by non-state actors.
Indeed, the Security Council itself recognized (albeit implicitly) its
potential role in shaping customary international law when it
expressly underscored that its resolutions authorizing action against
pirates in the territorial sea of Somalia "shall not be considered as
establishing customary international law."14

II. STATE PRACTICE AND OPINIO JURIs IN CONNECTION WITH THE
ACTIVITIES OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

I now turn to state practice consisting of, and opinio juris found
in, the conduct of states in connection with the activities of
international organizations (including but not limited to resolutions).
It is reasonably easy to find state practice in the context of
international organizations and often harder to find the opiniojuris of
states.
Draft conclusion 6, as provisionally adopted in 2014 by the
International Law Commission's Drafting Committee, includes among
a nonexhaustive list of 'forms of State practice' 'acts in connection with
resolutions
of international
organizations
or international
conferences'. This includes voting, joining in a consensus, statements
etc.
Evidence of opinio juris of states may also be found in connection
with their acts, including verbal acts, within international
organizations. Indeed, statements or votes within international
organizations are frequently cited, especially by writers, also as
evidence of opinio juris. This is a particularly difficult matter, and such

14.
See S.C. Res. 2125, T 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES 2125 (Nov. 18, 2013) (limiting the
resolution to the situation in Somalia so as not to affect the rights and obligations of
other member states to the relevant Convention).
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statements and votes need to be approached with considerable
caution. Political rather than legal considerations may play a dominant
role. It should not be assumed that states have carefully considered all
that they do, day after day, within international organizations.
Moreover, it is necessary to look with particular care at the context of
any statements or votes. The relevant considerations include such
questions as which states voted for the resolution? Did the vote include
all those states specially affected by the matter at hand? What did
states say about the resolution? Even states that vote in favor
frequently make it clear that they do not regard a particular resolution
as reflecting the law as it is (lex lata). Such matters are unfortunately
often overlooked.

III. THE PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

I turn finally to the contribution of international organizations
themselves to the formation and determination of rules of customary
international law. Much has been written about international
organizations as 'law-makers', but for the most part the writings
address matters other than their role in connection with customary
international law.
The issue was much discussed in the Commission's Drafting
Committee in 2014, and proved to be quite controversial. But it does
not seem possible to dismiss the practice of at least certain
international intergovernmental organizations in certain fields, such
as the law of treaties, or privileges and immunities. More widely, the
European Union (as a supranational organization to which states have
transferred some exclusive competences) may be very special, but it
exists, and it exercises some of the powers of states and so contributes
to practice and opinio juris. These facts cannot be ignored.
Draft Conclusion 4, paragraph 1, says that the requirement of a
general practice "means that it is primarilythe practice of states that
contributes to" customary international law. Draft Conclusion 4,
paragraph 2 provides that:
In certain cases, the practice of international organizations also
contributes to the formation, or expression, of rules of customary
international law.

And a footnote attached to this text currently reads:
The Drafting Committee provisionally adopted Draft Conclusion 4 with
the understanding that this draft conclusion would be considered again
at the next session in light of the analysis of the question of the practice
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of international organizations that will be part of the third report of the
15
Special Rapporteur.

One matter that the drafting may perhaps not make entirely clear
is whether the practice and opiniojuris of subjects of international law
other than states and international organizations may be relevant.
Questions may arise in connection with sui generis bodies, such as the
International Committee of the Red Cross. Nongovernmental
organizations and other private entities, however, would seem to have
no direct role. However influential they may sometimes be, it is only
through the reactions of states (or possibly international
organizations) that they may influence the law.
The debate continued at the Sixth Committee of the UN General
Assembly in 2014. The US representative, for example, expressed
concern
that the treatment of international organizations together with States in
Draft Conclusion 4 may be taken to suggest that these actors play the
same roles with respect to the formation of custom, obscuring, in
particular, significant limitations on the role of international
organizations in this regard ....
While we are not persuaded as yet that the practice of
international organizations is of general relevance to the identification
of custom, we are open to the possibility that there may be circumstances
in which some activities of international organizations may contribute to
16
the formation of customary international law.

If it is accepted, as I think it must be, that international organizations
as such may contribute to the formation of customary international
law, a number of quite difficult questions have to be addressed.
First, the practice and opinio juris of those international
organizations to which member states have transferred exclusive
competences would seem to fall into a special category. Their practice
may be equated with that of their member states, since in particular
fields such organizations act in place of the member states. This
applies to the actions of such organizations whatever form they take,
whether executive, legislative, or judicial. Indeed, if one were not to
equate the practice of such international organizations with that of
states, not only would the organization's practice not contribute to a
general practice but its member states would be deprived or reduced of
their ability to contribute to such practice in cases where they have
conferred some public powers to the organization.
Second, the question arises, which organs of international
organizations are relevant to the customary process? Such organs may

15.
Drafting Committee Chairman Statement, supra note 11, at 18 n.2.
16.
Stephen Townley, Counsellor for Legal Affairs, U.S. Mission to the United
Nations, Remarks at the 69th General Assembly Sixth Committee on Agenda Item 78:
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 66th Session (Nov. 5,
[http://perma.cc/4G942014), http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/233960.htm
5JBV] (archived Feb. 10, 2015).
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be divided in many ways, but perhaps the most important
distinctions for present purposes is a threefold one: organs composed
of states, such as the United Nations General Assembly and Security
Council; Secretariats, whose role varies greatly, but in the case of the
UN Secretary-General undoubtedly has an important political
element; and organs composed of individuals, such as a Special
Rapporteur for human rights appointed to fulfil a mandate laid down
by the Human Rights Council or the members of a UN field operation,
such as KFOR in Kosovo, or indeed the International Law Commission.
My view is that it is primarily the practice and opinio juris of
organs to which member states have delegated relevant powers that
may contribute to a general practice. As a member of the Commission
stated in 2013, the distinction is between the products of the
secretariats of international organizations and products of the
intergovernmental organs of international organizations. While both
can provide materials that can be consulted, the "greater relative
weight . . . [is to be] given to the products of the latter, whose authors
were also the primary authors of State practice."1 7 Nevertheless, the
acts of secretariats may be important. An example would be the
exercise of treaty depositary functions of the UN and other
secretariats. By contrast, the practice of organs composed of
individuals serving in their personal capacity cannot be said to
represent states or the organization.
Third, in assessing the practice of international organizations, we
need to distinguish between practice relating to the internal affairs of
the organization, on the one hand, and the practice of the organization
in its relations with states, international organizations, etc., on the
other. It is the latter practice that is relevant for present purposes,
though the dividing line may not always be clear.
Fourth, is it necessary that the organization be acting intra
vires-that is, within its mandate and powers and functions-for its
acts to count? Perhaps so, but it is not obvious why acts that are ultra
vires should not also count. In any event, it is often difficult to say
whether or not an organization is acting ultra vires in any given set of
circumstances. There is usually no authoritative decision maker.
Fifth, may inaction by an international organization play a part
in the determination of a rule of customary international law? Inaction
(acquiescence) of states often serves an important role in the formation
of rules of customary international law.
Finally, to the determination of which rules of international law
may the practice and opinio juris of organs of international
organizations contribute? It is generally assumed, and I think that this
is right, that they may contribute primarily to those rules of
international law by which they themselves are (or would be) bound.

17.
Int'l L. Comm'n, Provisional Summary Record of the 3182d Meeting, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SR.3182 (Sept. 3, 2013).
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That last point raises a separate yet important issue: to what
extent are international organizations bound by rules of customary
international law? That they may be so bound is clear.' 8 However,
there seems to have been little serious discussion-at least not in the
literature-of the actual scope of such international obligations of
international organizations. It is matter that is usually addressed in
the same breath as international personality (under some heading
such as "consequences of legal personality") or wrapped up with the
capacity of the organizations (their powers and functions). It is
sometimes simply asserted that since organizations have international
legal personality, and may therefore be the holders of international
rights and obligations, they are generally bound by international law
in the same way as states.1 9 Yet that does not necessarily follow.
In his work on International Organizationsas Law-makers, Jos6
Alvarez wrote
It . . . remains uncertain whether organizations . . . are liable for
violations of customary law, especially since it is not clear whether the
rules of custom, such as the rules arising under international
20
humanitarian law, apply in exactly the same way to IOs.

And Dapo Akande is surely right when he says that "[p]ossessing
international legal personality means that an organization possesses
rights and duties in international law, but this does not usually tell us
the particular rights and capacities possessed by a particular
organization." 2 1 What then is the position? As the Commission pointed
out in its General Commentary to its draft articles on the
Responsibility of international organizations, "International
organizations are quite different from States, and in addition present
great diversity among themselves. There are very significant
differences among international organizations with regard to . . . the
primary rules including treaty obligations by which they are bound." 22
This is indeed self-evident as regards treaties: most international
organizations are parties to few treaties, and even an organization like
the EU that has extensive treaty relations is not, and cannot be, a party
to some of the main multilateral conventions. The position as regards
customary international law is much more complex.2 3

18.

See ILC Report 2011, supra note 9, at 96-97.

19.

See PHILIPPE SANDS & PIERRE KLEIN, BOWETT's LAW OF INTERNATIONAL

ORGANIZATIONS 14.034-14.035, 14.037 (6th ed. 2009).
20.

JOSE E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS As LAW-MAKERS

138

(2006).
21.
Dapo Akande, InternationalOrganizations, in INTERNATIONAL LAw 282 (M.
Evans ed., 4th ed. 2014).
22.
ILC Report 2011, supra note 9, at 68.
23.
See H.G. SCHERMERS & N.M. BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW
1579 (5th rev. ed. 2011); see also FREDERICK NAERT, INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF
THE EU's SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY, WITH A PARTICULAR Focus ON THE LAW OF

¶

ARMED CONFLICT 230-33(2010) (discussing the uncertainty as to whether privileges and
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To conclude, I have sought to explain that the proceedings of
international organizations offer a rich field for state practice and
manifestations of state opinio juris. But it is a field that has to be
approached with some caution, given the often ambiguous or dual
nature of proceedings in such organizations.
And likewise, while on one view international organizations may
provide shortcuts to finding custom, at the same time, considerable
caution is required in assessing their practice, and a number of
important issues need to be considered. I hope that the International
Law Commission will be able to shed some light in this regard as it
continues its work on the topic of "identification of customary
international law."
I have perhaps raised more questions than I have answered. What
certain,
however, is that in approaching this subject I have
is
benefitted greatly from reading what Jonathan Charney wrote. This is
a difficult field, and we certainly miss his wisdom and insights. And
while you may find much that I have said to be rather theoretical (to
an extent that is perhaps inevitable when discussing the sources of
public international law), I would like to conclude by quoting what
Professor Reisman said in 2002 of Jonathan Charney's approach to
customary international law:
While he was interested in theory and contributed to it and he had many
suggestions to make about improving international law, he was at heart
24
an empiricist.

immunities enjoyed by international organizations are rooted in customary international
law); Albert Bleckmann, Zur Verbindlichkeit des Algemeinen Volkerrechts far
InternationalOrganisationen,37 HEIDELBERG J. INT'L L. 107 (1977).
24.
Reisman, supra note 1, at 24.

